A contest success function for networks
نویسندگان
چکیده
This paper models conflict within a network of friendships and enmities between players. We assume that each player is either in a friendly or in an antagonistic relation with every other player and players compete for a fixed prize by exerting costly efforts. We axiomatically characterize a success function which determines the share of each player given the efforts and the network of relations. This framework allows for the study of strategic incentives and friendship formation under conflict as well as the application of stability concepts of network theory to contests.
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