Husserl, the Absolute Flow, and Temporal Experience

Edmund Husserl’s phenomenological analysis of internal time consciousness has a reputation for being complex, occasionally to the point of approaching impenetrability. The latter applies in particular to his remarks about what he calls the ‘absolute time-constituting flow’, some of which Husserl himself describes as ‘‘shocking (when not initially even absurd)’’ (Husserl, 1991, p. 84). Perhaps it is because many readers of Husserl have found the passages on the absolute flow off-puttingly difficult that they have had fairly little impact, outside the specific field of Husserl studies, on the literature on temporal experience at large—certainly much less so than is the case for Husserl’s analysis of temporal experience in terms of the tripartite structure of primal impression, retention and protention. In a major recent study of temporal experience, for instance, Barry Dainton discusses in detail Husserl’s early attempts to give an account of temporal experience in terms of that tripartite structure, but mentions only briefly later developments that also feature the notion of the absolute flow, commenting that he ‘‘find[s] the relevant Husserlian writings obscure’’ (Dainton, 2006, p. 160). I believe this state of affairs is unfortunate for two reasons. First, there is actually a fairly straightforward way of making sense of the notion of the absolute flow with the help of some theoretical notions familiar from recent philosophical work on perception. Secondly,