A comparison of first price multi-object auctions
نویسنده
چکیده
We compare multi-object English-type ascending price auctions with first price sealed bid auctions in private values environments with multi-object demands. Special attention is paid to the effect of closing rules on ascending auctions’ outcomes. JEL classification code: C92, D44
منابع مشابه
A Comparative Study of Multi-Attribute Continuous Double Auction Mechanisms
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