Ayn Rand’s Theory of Concepts: A Brief Overview

This paper summarizes Rand’s theory of concepts as presented in the first five chapters of Introduction to Objectivist Epistemology. Rand’s approach to universals, essentials, and definitions is discussed, and key Randian usages such as “unit,” “measurement,” “distinguishing characteristic” and “Conceptual Common Denominator” are explained. An appendix summarizes Rand’s treatment of several concepts. Introduction Ayn Rand’s theory of concepts is presented in her monograph Introduction to Objectivist Epistemology (a.k.a. ITOE. See the sources for a full citation; all references are to the Second edition). The purpose of the theory is to explain how it is, in the most basic sense, that our abstract knowledge can be objective knowledge of reality. Knowledge is formed in theories and propositions, but the basic building blocks are concepts, the mental content that lies behind our use of general terms. In her foreword, Rand writes: “concepts are abstractions or universals, and everything man perceives in particular, concrete. What is the relation between abstractions and concretes? To what precisely do concepts refer in reality?” (1) Answering these questions is the task Rand has set for herself. Rand’s theory attempts to resolve a dichotomy that runs throughout the history of Western philosophy. On the one hand, realists, of whom Aristotle and Plato were thought to number, argued that the referents of general terms must consist in or partake of some identical, universal nature. Concepts therefore would have a real basis. All men would have “manness,” whatever that might be, or would perhaps reflect the ideal Form of Man as existing in some dimension known only to the intellect (as the Platonic tradition held). On the other hand, nominalists (from Occam to the American pragmatists to Wittgenstein), emphasized the fact that general terms are used according to human choice: no terms are forced upon us by existence. Universals do not exist as such, and the nominalists thus tend to hold that our concepts are not constrained by reality in any way that can be made clear. Rand resolves this contradiction by constructing a theory that recognizes, with the nominalists, that universals do not exist metaphysically and that human purposes and contexts contribute to the formation of concepts. But Rand’s theory also insists, with the realists, that the nature of the referents of a general term constrains the term and gives an objective basis to the human decision to regard those referents as similar. People have no identical “man-ness” to partake of, but the attributes and characteristics that people do have—their metaphysical identities—provide a real basis, independent of human thought, for the concept of “man.”