Empirical Hardness Models for Combinatorial Auctions
نویسندگان
چکیده
Shoham In this chapter we consider the empirical hardness of the winner determination problem. We identify distribution-nonspecific features of data instances and then use statistical regression techniques to learn, evaluate and interpret a function from these features to the predicted hardness of an instance, focusing mostly on ILOG's CPLEX solver. We also describe two applications of these models: building an algorithm portfolio that selects among different WDP algorithms, and inducing test distributions that are harder for this algorithm portfolio.
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