Boundedly Rational versus Optimization-Based Models of Strategic Thinking and Learning in Games†
نویسنده
چکیده
A neoclassical microeconomics is one of social science’s success stories, a growing body of experimental and empirical research has documented substantial deviations from its core behavioral assumptions and predictions (Selten 1990, 1998; Thaler 1992; Rabin 1998; Frederick, Loewenstein, and O’Donoghue 2002; Camerer 2003; Sobel 2005; DellaVigna 2009; Armstrong and Huck 2010; Crawford, Costa-Gomes, and Iriberri 2013).1 Because the deviations have identifiable systematic components, modeling them and integrating them into microeconomics has the potential to strengthen our models of individual decisions and strategic behavior, and the economic analyses that depend on them. Attempts to model the deviations can be sorted into two categories, following Harstad and Selten’s article in this forum. Most models in either category can be augmented to allow decision errors, which is usually essential in empirical applications. However, I will
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