Full revelation of information in Sender-Receiver games of persuasion
نویسنده
چکیده
We provide necessary and su¢ cient conditions on both players preferences and information that can be certi ed for a Sender-Receiver game to possess a separating equilibrium, as well as su¢ cient conditions for every equilibrium of such a game to be separating. Accordingly, we generalize Seidmann and Winters [D.J. Seidmann, E. Winter, Strategic information transmission with veri able messages, Econometrica 65 (1997) 163170] results to games with partial provability. Key words: Disclosure of certi able information; Partial provability; Persuasion; Separating equilibrium; Veri able types JEL classi cation: C72, D82
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ورودعنوان ژورنال:
- J. Economic Theory
دوره 143 شماره
صفحات -
تاریخ انتشار 2008