Evolution of Cooperation: Combining Kin Selection and Reciprocal Altruism into Matrix Games with Social Dilemmas
نویسندگان
چکیده
Darwinian selection should preclude cooperation from evolving; yet cooperation is widespread among organisms. We show how kin selection and reciprocal altruism can promote cooperation in diverse 2×2 matrix games (prisoner's dilemma, snowdrift, and hawk-dove). We visualize kin selection as non-random interactions with like-strategies interacting more than by chance. Reciprocal altruism emerges from iterated games where players have some likelihood of knowing the identity of other players. This perspective allows us to combine kin selection and reciprocal altruism into a general matrix game model. Both mechanisms operating together should influence the evolution of cooperation. In the absence of kin selection, reciprocal altruism may be an evolutionarily stable strategy but is unable to invade a population of non-co-operators. Similarly, it may take a high degree of relatedness to permit cooperation to supplant non-cooperation. Together, a little bit of reciprocal altruism can, however, greatly reduce the threshold at which kin selection promotes cooperation, and vice-versa. To properly frame applications and tests of cooperation, empiricists should consider kin selection and reciprocal altruism together rather than as alternatives, and they should be applied to a broader class of social dilemmas than just the prisoner's dilemma.
منابع مشابه
On the suitability of the 2 x 2 games for studying reciprocal cooperation and kin selection
The 2 x 2 games, in particular the Prisoner’s Dilemma, have been extensively used in studies into reciprocal cooperation and, to a lesser extent, kin selection. This paper examines the suitability of the 2 x 2 games for modelling the evolution of cooperation through reciprocation and kin selection. This examination is not restricted to the Prisoner’s Dilemma, but includes the other non-trivial ...
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