Repeated Games Without Public Randomization: A Constructive Approach∗
نویسندگان
چکیده
We study infinitely repeated games with perfect monitoring and without public randomization devices. Both symmetric and asymmetric discounting cases are considered; a new geometric construct called “self-accessibility” is proposed and used to unify the analyses of these two cases. In the case of symmetric discounting, our approach delivers a constructive version of the folk theorem of Fudenberg and Maskin (1991). If discounting is asymmetric, we show that any payoff that is in the interior of the smallest rectangular region that contains the stage game feasible set is realizable in the repeated game for identifiable sets of discount factor vectors. Next, we provide necessary and sufficient conditions for payoff vectors to be subgame-perfect equilibrium payoffs for some discount factor vector. Sets that are defined by these conditions are easily described; moreover, discount factor vectors and strategies that support a specific payoff vector can be explicitly constructed.
منابع مشابه
The Folk Theorem for all Games with Almost Perfect Monitoring
We study repeated games with private monitoring. We prove the folk theorem with discounting for all games assuming that the monitoring is almost perfect and the payoffs satisfy the full-dimensionality condition. We assume no cheap-talk communication between players, no public randomization, and we allow for minmax payoffs in mixed strategies.
متن کاملThe Folk Theorem for Games with Private Almost-Perfect Monitoring∗
We prove the folk theorem for discounted repeated games under private, almost-perfect monitoring. Our result covers all finite, n-player games satisfying the usual full-dimensionality condition. Mixed strategies are allowed in determining the individually rational payoffs. We assume no cheap-talk communication between players and no public randomization device.
متن کاملFirst-best collusion without communication
I study a 2-bidder infinitely repeated IPV first-price auction without transfers, communication, or public randomization, where each bidder’s valuation can assume, in each of the (statistically independent) stage games, one of three possible values. If the probability of the high valuation is sufficiently large and the medium valuation is between one third and one half of the high valuation, th...
متن کاملFolk Theorem in Repeated Games with Private Monitoring
We show that the folk theorem generically holds for N -player repeated games with private monitoring when each players number of signals is su¢ ciently large. Neither cheap talk communication nor public randomization is necessary. Journal of Economic Literature Classi cation Numbers: C72, C73, D82
متن کامل