Attributing Mental Attitudes to the Normative Systems

The role of norms in the formalization of multiagent systems is to stabilize the behavior of a multiagent system, and thus they play the same role for such systems as intentions do for single agent systems. However, it is still an open problem whether they should be represented explicitly, for example in a deontic logic, or they can also be represented implicitly. Boella and Lesmo [1] propose a definition of obligation in terms of beliefs, goals and desires, inspired by Goffman’s game-theoretic interpretation of norms and by recursive modelling. The aim of this definition is to distinguish various reasons why agents fulfil or violate obligations. In this paper, we extend [1]’s definition of sanction based norms by explicitly attributing beliefs, desires and goals both to the bearer of a norm and to the normative system. Boella and Lesmo [1] propose to attribute mental states to normative systems such as legal or moral systems, as an instance of Dennett’s intentional stance [6]. We start with a definition of Carmo and Jones. Normative systems are “sets of agents whose interactions can fruitfully be regarded as norm-governed; the norms prescribe how the agents ideally should and should not behave [...]. Importantly, the norms allow for the possibility that [...] violations of obligations, or of agents’ rights, may occur” [7]. We restrict ourselves to the interpretation of normative multiagent systems as dynamic social orders. According to Castelfranchi [4], a social order is a pattern of interactions among