Strategic delegation and voting rules
نویسنده
چکیده
Article history: Received 6 February 2009 Received in revised form 10 August 2009 Accepted 9 September 2009 Available online 30 September 2009 JEL classification: D71 D72 F53 H11
منابع مشابه
The Computational Impact of Partial Votes on Strategic Voting
In many real world elections, agents are not required to rank all candidates. We study three of the most common methods used to modify voting rules to deal with such partial votes. These methods modify scoring rules (like the Borda count), elimination style rules (like single transferable vote) and rules based on the tournament graph (like Copeland) respectively. We argue that with an eliminati...
متن کاملOrganizing for strategy making: An information aggregation view
This study examines the process of strategic decision making within organizations by analyzing four commonly used information aggregation structures: individual decision making, delegation to experts, voting, and averaging of opinions. Using a formal mathematical model, we investigate how the performance of each of these structures is contingent upon the breadth of knowledge within the firm and...
متن کاملTicket-splitting and strategic voting under mixed electoral rules: Evidence from Germany
There is more to strategic voting than simply avoiding wasting one’s vote if one is liberated from the corset of studying voting behavior in plurality systems. Mixed electoral systems provide different voters with diverse incentives to cast a strategic vote.They not only determine the degree of strategic voting, but also the kind of strategies voters employ. Strategic voters employ either a was...
متن کاملPattern matching encryption, strategic equivalence of range voting and approval voting, and statistical robustness of voting rules
We present new results in the areas of cryptography and voting systems. 1. Pattern matching encryption: We present new, general definitions for queryable encryption schemes – encryption schemes that allow evaluation of private queries on encrypted data without performing full decryption. We construct an efficient queryable encryption scheme supporting pattern matching queries, based on suffix t...
متن کاملStrategic Voting with Incomplete Information
Classical results in social choice theory on the susceptibility of voting rules to strategic manipulation make the assumption that the manipulator has complete information regarding the preferences of the other voters. In reality, however, voters only have incomplete information, which limits their ability to manipulate. We explore how these limitations affect both the manipulability of voting ...
متن کامل