Informativeness and Moore’s Paradox∗
نویسنده
چکیده
The first case is usually referred to as omissive and the second as commissive. What is traditionally perceived as paradoxical is that although such statements may well be true, asserting them is clearly absurd. An account of Moore’s Paradox is an explanation of the absurdity. In the last twenty years, there has also been a focus on the incoherence of judging or believing such propositions. In their recent survey of accounts of Moore’s Paradox, Mitchell Green and John Williams (2007b) divide current accounts of Moorean absurdity into four categories: Moorean Speech as Theoretically Irrational, Moorean Speech as Practically Irrational, Moorean Belief as Theoretically Irrational, and Moorean Belief as Practically Irrational. The first category, Moorean Speech as Theoretically Irrational, includes Moore’s own account (in an assertion that p the speaker implicates that she believes that p— Moore 1944), Wittgenstein’s account (in saying that she believes that p the speaker asserts that p—Wittgenstein 1953, section X of part 2), and Max Black’s account ∗I am very much indebted to comments from Mitchell Green on a first draft, and likewise to an anonymous Analysis referee for constructive comments on a penultimate version, as well as to Kathrin Glüer for discussion of the ideas on many occasions. Thanks also to the audience at Filosofidagarna, Umeå, June 2007.
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