Popular Nationalism and International Conflict

Does popular nationalism breed international conflict? International relations scholars have either dismissed nationalism as epiphenomenal or have assumed that it increases the likelihood of interstate violence. Contrary to these conventional views, this paper claims that popular nationalism can have a stabilizing effect, which facilitates the status quo, and that its conflictinducing effect appears only when a country’s chance of total victory in conflict is fairly high. Popular nationalism can have diverse effects, as it induces two distinct foreign policy preferences at the individual level: nationalistic sentiments make individuals prefer not only a hawkish foreign policy means but also complete success as a foreign policy outcome. A nationalistic public’s demand for complete success prevents leaders from hastily jumping into international conflict due to high domestic costs of a failed conflict and a greater chance to pay such costs. A survey experiment and a case study on the territorial dispute between China, Taiwan, and Japan provide empirical evidence supporting this argument. Please do not circulate or cite without permission. Any comments and suggestions are greatly appreciated. ∗Postdoctoral Fellow, The Notre Dame International Security Center, University of Notre Dame †Email: [email protected]