Learn Your Opponent's Strategy (in Polynominal Time)!
نویسندگان
چکیده
Agents that interact in a distributed environment might increase their utility by behaving optimally given the strategies of the other agents. To do so, agents need to learn about those with whom they share the same world. This paper examines interactions among agents from a game theoretic perspective. In this context , learning has been assumed as a means to reach equilibrium. We analyze the complexity of this learning process. We start with a restricted two{agent model, in which agents are represented by nite automata, and one of the agents plays a xed strategy. We show that even with this restrictions, the learning process may be exponential in time. We then suggest a criterion of simplicity, that induces a class of automata that are learnable in polynomial time.
منابع مشابه
Learn Your Opponent's Strategy (in Polynomial Time)! Conference Item Learn Your Opponent's Strategy(in Polynomial Time)!
Copyright and Moral Rights for the articles on this site are retained by the individual authors and/or other copyright owners. For more information on Open Research Online's data policy on reuse of materials please consult the policies page. Abstract Agents that interact in a distributed environment might increase their utility by behaving optimally given the strategies of the other agents. To ...
متن کاملEvolutionary Entertainment with Intelligent Agents
A common limitation of conventional video games is that players quickly learn the positions and behavior of computer-controlled characters , which usually take the form of monsters. Software developers pre-program these characteristics so, after playing the game several times, the player comes to know exactly how and when the monsters will act. The game eventually becomes boring because the pla...
متن کاملBLGAN: Bayesian Learning and Genetic Algorithm for Supporting Negotiation With Incomplete Information
Automated negotiation provides a means for resolving differences among interacting agents. For negotiation with complete information, this paper provides mathematical proofs to show that an agent's optimal strategy can be computed using its opponent's reserve price (RP) and deadline. The impetus of this work is using the synergy of Bayesian learning (BL) and genetic algorithm (GA) to determine ...
متن کاملمدیر موفق کیست؟
Who is a really successful manager? A manager who spends less money, or the one who earns more? A manager who can survive for a longer period of time, or an administrator who expands his organization, and opens up new branches? Which one is the most successful? The article tries to answer these questions and provides, some simple guidlines for the managers in every domain of management who wan...
متن کاملذخیره در منابع من
با ذخیره ی این منبع در منابع من، دسترسی به آن را برای استفاده های بعدی آسان تر کنید
عنوان ژورنال:
دوره شماره
صفحات -
تاریخ انتشار 1995