Hume’s Theory of Belief

Hume’s Treatment of Denial in the Treatise

Thomas Reid’s and Barry Stroud’s discussions of David Hume’s work are separated in time by approximately 200 years. Nevertheless, there is a striking similarity between concerns they raise about David Hume’s theory of judgment (as presented in his Treatise of Human Nature). In short: both Reid and Stroud regard Hume’s theory as incapable of providing an adequate account of negative judgment, or...

Marc-Arthur Diaye and André Lapidus – Pleasure and Belief in Hume’s Decision Process

It is currently acknowledged, among Hume scholars interested in modern philosophy of action, that his theory of the motives to action was some kind of belief-desire theory – which refers to what is today called “folk psychology”. Of course, the relative parts of belief and desire, as well as their respective contents, have been subject to constant discussions1. But the framework of the theory h...

Doxastic Virtues in Hume’s Epistemology

In this paper, I elucidate Hume’s account of doxastic virtues and offer three reasons that contemporary epistemologists ought to consider it as an alternative to one of the broadly Aristotelian models currently offered. Specifically, I suggest that Hume’s account of doxastic virtues obviates (1) the much-debated question about whether such virtues are intellectual, “moral,” or some combination ...

General Rules and the Justification of Probable Belief in Hume’s Treatise

Empiricism, Time-awareness, and Hume’s Manners of Disposition

The issue of time-awareness presents a critical challenge for empiricism: if temporal properties are not directly perceived, how do we become aware of them? A unique empiricist account of time-awareness suggested by Hume’s comments on time in the Treatise avoids the problems characteristic of other empiricist accounts. Hume’s theory, however, has some counter-intuitive consequences. The failure...