Entrenching the Yoshida Defense Doctrine: Three Techniques for Institutionalization

Japan's level of defense expenditure relative to tbe size of its economy bas long been uniquely low among the major industrialized countries. As of 1995, Japan's expenditures stood at 0.96 percent of gross domestic product (GDP).' Even adding to this tbe approximately 0.3 percent of GDP devoted to pensions for retired personnel, the level of spending is considerably less than that of major Westem states such as tbe United States, United Kingdom, France, and Germany, as well as industrialized Asian states such as South Korea, Taiwan, Malaysia, and Singapore. Furthermore, these relative magnitudes have remained reasonably stable over tbe past few decades (see Table 1).̂ Defense expenditure as a percentage of GDP or GNP (gross national product),^ often referred to simply as "defense burden," has over tbe past few decades become the standard benchmark for measuring a state's relative contribution to international security.'' Because of this, tbe appropriateness and consequences of Japan's relatively low expenditure of national wealth on defense bave been hotly debated botb in Japan and abroad. Critics accuse Japan of unfairly exploiting a defense "free ride" to build its economic success,^ and others worry that Japan's lack of military capabilities prevents it from becoming a "normal state" whose political role is commensurate