Does Lootable Wealth Breed Disorder? a Political Economy of Extraction Framework

This article proposes a political economy of extraction framework that accounts for political order and state collapse as alternative outcomes in the face of lootable wealth. Different types of institutions of extraction can be built around lootable resources—with divergent effects on political stability. If rulers are able to forge institutions of extraction that give them control over the revenues generated by lootable resources, then these resources can contribute to the maintenance of political order by providing the income with which to govern. In contrast, the breakdown or absence of such institutions increases the risk of civil war by making it easier for rebels to get income. The framework is used to explain two puzzling cases that experienced sharply contrasting political trajectories in the face of lootable resources: Sierra Leone and Burma. A focus on institutions of extraction provides a stronger understanding of the wide range of political possibilities—from chaos, through dictatorship, to democracy—in resource-rich countries.