”Engineering Electoral Systems to Increase Turnout”

In this paper we propose two mechanisms that can be used as a solution to low participation levels in PR elections. The first tool we propose is an electoral rule where the number of candidates elected depends on the level of participation. The second tool we propose is a participation quorum that has to be met in order for the election to be valid. In both cases we characterize all possible equilibria. We show that the first tool stimulates turnout only when parties obtain high benefits for every seat they get in the parliament. In the case of a participation quorum, we show that there always exists a quorum, that in equilibrium is binding and results in higher turnout. Both mechanisms, when they increase turnout, they increase voters’ welfare and imply lower profits for the parties. Finally, our tools dominate compulsory voting in terms of voters’ welfare. ∗I am grateful to my thesis’ advisor Enriqueta Aragonès, Jon Eguia, Jordi Masso, Andrea Mattozzi, Hannes Mueller, seminar audiences in UAB and UC3M as well as conference participants in Porto for valuable comments. Obviously, all errors remain mine.