Voters, Dictators, and Peons: Expressive Voting and Pivotality
نویسندگان
چکیده
Why do the poor vote against redistribution? We experimentally examine one explanation, namely that individuals gain direct expressive utility from voting in accordance with their ideology and understand they are unlikely to be pivotal; hence, their expressive utility, even if arbitrarily small, determines their voting behavior. In contrast with a basic prediction of this explanation, we nd that the probability of being pivotal does not a¤ect the impact of monetary interest on whether a subject votes for redistribution.
منابع مشابه
How Often Are You Decisive: an Enquiry About the Pivotality of Voting Rules
The probability that an individual is decisive in an election is an important criterion for the evaluation of voting rules. It depends on factors such as the number and the behaviour of the other voters, the available alternatives and, of course, also on the voting rule itself. Classical power indices like the Banzhafor the Shapley-Shubik-Index are only applicable in special cases. In this pape...
متن کاملInequality aversion and voting on redistribution☆
Some people have a concern for a fair distribution of incomes while others do not. Does such a concern matter for majority voting on redistribution? Fairness preferences are relevant for redistribution outcomes only if fair-minded voters are pivotal. Pivotality, in turn, depends on the structure of income classes. We experimentally study voting on redistribution between two income classes and s...
متن کاملwww.econstor.eu Inequality aversion and voting on redistribution
Some people have a concern for a fair distribution of incomes while others do not. Does such a concern matter for majority voting on redistribution? Fairness preferences are relevant for redistribution outcomes only if fair-minded voters are pivotal. Pivotality, in turn, depends on the structure of income classes. We experimentally study voting on redistribution between two income classes and s...
متن کاملOne in a Million: A Field Experiment on Belief Formation and Pivotal Voting∗
Instrumental voting models predict that turnout depends on the chance of casting a pivotal vote, which is typically extremely low in large elections. Evidence from psychology and behavioral economics suggests that misperceptions of extremely unlikely events are common and subject to systematic biases, sometimes called the non-belief in the law of large numbers. We provide a model of voting when...
متن کاملDouble voter perceptible blind signature based electronic voting protocol
Mu et al. have proposed an electronic voting protocol and claimed that it protects anonymity of voters, detects double voting and authenticates eligible voters. It has been shown that it does not protect voter's privacy and prevent double voting. After that, several schemes have been presented to fulfill these properties. However, many of them suffer from the same weaknesses. In this p...
متن کاملذخیره در منابع من
با ذخیره ی این منبع در منابع من، دسترسی به آن را برای استفاده های بعدی آسان تر کنید
عنوان ژورنال:
دوره شماره
صفحات -
تاریخ انتشار 2010