Positional rules and q-Condorcet consistency
نویسندگان
چکیده
A well-known result in Social Choice theory is the following: every scoring rule (positional rules) violates Condorcet consistency. A rule is Condorcet consistent when it selects the alternative that is preferred to every other alternative by a majority of individuals. In this paper, we investigate some limits of this negative result. We expose the relationship between a weaker version of the Condorcet consistency principle and the scoring rules. Our main objective is then to study the condition on the quota that ensure that positional rules (simple and sequential) satisfy this principle.
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