Nuclear Proliferation Dangers in the NIS: An Interim Assessment

Introduction The collapse of the Soviet Union could result in a variety of nuclear proliferation dangers. Some of the newly independent states (NIS) may retain former Soviet nuclear weapons or develop their own nuclear weapons capability. Others are capable of supplying nuclear weapons and missile equipment, technology, or materials to states outside the NIS. Ongoing conflicts in several regions of the former USSR could also lead contending political groups to seek to purchase or steal nuclear weapons or attempt to develop radiological weapons. This article identifies the primary nuclear proliferation dangers in the former Soviet Union and examines incentives and disincentives for nuclear weapons acquisition or for weapons-related nuclear trade. It evaluates military, political, and economic factors to identify those states and groups with the strongest proliferation motivations. Finally, it addresses technical constraints and compares motivations and constraints in order to assess the severity of proliferation threats. This analysis leads to three conclusions. First, Ukraine is the only NIS state apart from Russia that has both the incentives and the capability to acquire control of nuclear weapons in the near term. Second, some leaders and opposition groups in Central Asia and the Caucasus have limited technical capabilities to acquire nuclear weapons, but strong incentives to do so, given ongoing conflicts and security concerns. Thus, efforts by these actors to buy or steal nuclear weapons cannot be ruled out. Third, the greatest proliferation threat is that weapons-related nuclear materials, technology, and knowledge will cross state boundaries and aid the nuclear weapons development efforts of outside states such as Iran, Pakistan, India, Iraq, Libya, or North Korea. The final section of the article examines several possible events in the NIS that could cause sharp changes or “shocks” to the proliferation situation.