Is There Progress in Morality?

My question, which is central to the business of moral philosophy, is implicitly addressed by many philosophers, yet explicitly addressed by only a few. In this paper I address the question head-on, and propose a qualified affirmative answer. First, however, it is important to be clear about what is meant by 'morality' and 'progress', and what the meaning of 'is' is. My characterizations will not be exact, but I hope they will be precise enough to specify a domain that can be productively investigated. The moral progress with which I am concerned is not that which consists entirely in improvements in our understanding of the semantics of moral discourse, nor entirely in the development of increasingly adequate normative theories. My interest is in whether there is progress on the ground with whether, in some sense, morality is ascendant in a particular domain. Of course, progress in metaethics and moral theory may contribute to progress in moral practice, but whether or not this is so I shall not try to say here. Nor will I worry about the distinction that some have drawn between ethics and morality. What matters for me is the contrast between the right and the good, on one hand, and the wrong and the bad, on the other, where these categories are broadly construed.