Handbook of Social Choice and Voting
نویسندگان
چکیده
This chapter reviews the strange history of social choice, elements of which have been understood for perhaps two thousand years. Isolated thinkers in the 13th, 15th, 18th and 19th centuries made substantial contributions to the field but almost always in ignorance of the work of their predecessors. Social choice was not established as a cumulative field of study until the middle of the 20th century. The chapter concludes with some reflections on this strange state of affairs.
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