The strong sequential core for stationary cooperative games
نویسنده
چکیده
Infinite time horizon stationary cooperative games are considered where at each date the instantaneous NTU-game is determined by the state of nature. The strong sequential core selects those utility streams that no coalition can improve upon by deviating at any moment in time. The main result of the paper states that the strong sequential core is non-empty provided that (i) the instantaneous NTU-games in all states are additively b-balanced, (ii) at least one of these games is strongly additively b-balanced, and (iii) the discount factor is close enough to one. © 2006 Published by Elsevier Inc. JEL classification: C71; C73
منابع مشابه
Core Concepts for Dynamic TU Games
This paper is concerned with the question of how to de ne the core when cooperation takes place in a dynamic setting. The focus is on dynamic cooperative games in which the players face a nite sequence of exogenously speci ed TU-games. Three di erent core concepts are presented: the classical core, the strong sequential core and the weak sequential core. The di erences between the concepts aris...
متن کاملDynamic linear programming games with risk-averse players
Motivated by situations in which independent agents, or players, wish to cooperate in some uncertain endeavor over time, we study dynamic linear programming games, which generalize classical linear production games to multi-period settings under uncertainty. We specifically consider that players may have risk-averse attitudes towards uncertainty, and model this risk aversion using coherent cond...
متن کاملImplementation of the Recursive Core for Partition Function Form Games∗
In partition function form games, the recursive core (r-core) is implemented by a modified version of Perry and Reny’s (1994) non-cooperative game. Specifically, every stationary subgame perfect Nash equilibrium (SSPNE) outcome is an r-core outcome. With the additional assumption of total r-balancedness, every r-core outcome is an SSPNE outcome.
متن کاملCooperative Benefit and Cost Games under Fairness Concerns
Solution concepts in cooperative games are based on either cost games or benefit games. Although cost games and benefit games are strategically equivalent, that is not the case in general for solution concepts. Motivated by this important observation, a new property called invariance property with respect to benefit/cost allocation is introduced in this paper. Since such a property can be regar...
متن کاملPricing and Advertising Decisions in a Three-level Supply Chain with Nash, Stackelberg and Cooperative Games
Pricing and advertising are two important marketing strategies in the supply chain management which lead to customer demand’s increase and therefore higher profit for members of supply chains. This paper considers advertising, and pricing decisions simultaneously for a three-level supply chain with one supplier, one manufacturer and one retailer. The amount of market demand is influenced ...
متن کاملذخیره در منابع من
با ذخیره ی این منبع در منابع من، دسترسی به آن را برای استفاده های بعدی آسان تر کنید
برای دانلود متن کامل این مقاله و بیش از 32 میلیون مقاله دیگر ابتدا ثبت نام کنید
ثبت ناماگر عضو سایت هستید لطفا وارد حساب کاربری خود شوید
ورودعنوان ژورنال:
- Games and Economic Behavior
دوره 61 شماره
صفحات -
تاریخ انتشار 2007