Inferring Higher Level Policies from Firewall Rules

Packet filtering firewall is one of the most important mechanisms used by corporations to enforce their security policy. Recent years have seen a lot of research in the area of firewall management. Typically, firewalls use a large number of low-level filtering rules which are configured using vendor-specific tools. System administrators start off by writing rules which implement the security policy of the organization. They add/delete/change order of rules as the requirements change. For example, when a new machine is added to the network, new rules might be added to the firewall to enable certain services to/from that machine. Making such changes to the low-level rules is complicated by the fact that the effect of a rule is dependent on its priority (usually determined by the position of the rule in the rule set). As the size and complexity of a rule set increase, it becomes difficult to understand the impact of a rule on the rule set. This makes management of rule sets more error prone. This is a very serious problem as errors in firewall configuration mean that the desired security policy is not enforced. Previous research in this area has focused on either building tools that generate low-level firewall rules from a given security policy or finding anomalies in the rules, i.e., verifying that the rules implement the given security policy correctly. We propose a technique that aims to infer the high-level security policy from low-level representation. The first step in our approach is that of generating flattened rules, i.e., rules without priorities, which are equivalent to the given firewall rule set. Removal of priorities from a rule set enables us to merge a number of rules that have a similar effect. Our rule merging algorithm reduces the size and complexity of the rule set significantly by grouping the services, hosts, and protocols present in these rules into various (possibly overlapping) classes. We have built a prototype implementation of our approach for iptables firewall rules. Our preliminary experiments indicate that the technique infers security policy that is at a sufficiently high level of abstraction to make it understandable and debuggable.