Inspection Games
نویسندگان
چکیده
We examine the effectiveness of bonuses and fines in an ‘inspection game’ where an employer can learn the effort of a worker through costly inspection. Standard game theoretic analysis predicts that fines discourage shirking, whereas bonuses encourage shirking. In contrast, ownpayoff effects suggest that both fines and bonuses discourage shirking. In an experiment we find that fines are more effective than bonuses in reducing shirking. However, we do not find that bonuses encourage shirking. Behavioral theories based on Impulse Balance Equilibrium or Quantal Response Equilibrium provide a good account of deviations from Nash equilibrium predictions.
منابع مشابه
Learning with games in a professional environment: a case study of a serious game about levee inspection
Serious games are an increasingly popular field and this has resulted in a large number of serious games so far. Despite this growth, relatively little gaming research is focused on professional environments. In particular, a lack exists in reflecting on the design and learning experiences. To take a step in this desired direction, this paper examines learning with games in professional environ...
متن کاملSupply Chain Strategies for Quality Inspection under a Customer Return Policy: A Game Theoretical Approach
This paper outlines the quality inspection strategies in a supplier–buyer supply chain under a customer return policy. This paper primarily focuses on product quality and quality inspection techniques to maximize the actors’ and supply chain’s profits using game theory approach. The supplier–buyer setup is described in terms of textile manufacturer–retailer supply chain where quality inspection...
متن کاملAmbient environmental inspections in repeated
We consider an environmental inspection agency who credibly commits to a permanent observation of ambient pollution at the property line of individual rms. In this setting, standard results in the theory of repeated games generalize to enforcement games. The inspection agency obtains partial compliance without ever penalizing the polluter, even in settings where it would never obtain any compli...
متن کاملMethodological aspects of a GIS-based environmental health inspection program used in the Athens 2004 Olympic and Para Olympic Games
BACKGROUND The use of geographical information system (GIS) technologies in public health surveillance is gradually gaining momentum around the world and many applications have already been reported in the literature. In this study, GIS technology was used to help county departments of Public Health to implement environmental health surveillance for the Athens 2004 Olympic and Para Olympic Game...
متن کاملNon-zero-sum Dresher inspection games
An inspection game is here a non-cooperative two-person-game between an inspector and an inspectee. It models a situation where the inspector controls the inspectee who has an incentive to violate certain legal obligations. A recent survey of inspection games applied to data verification, for example in nuclear material safeguards, is given in [1]. Dresher [2] described a sequential inspection ...
متن کامل