Cheap Talk and Evolutionary Dynamics*
نویسنده
چکیده
The effect of cheap talk in partnership games on the evolutionary dynamics of homogeneous populations under symmetric and random matching is analyzed. As long as the message set is sufficiently large there exists an Asymptotically Stable Set with payoffs arbitrarily close to the maximal payoff for each player. However this only holds true for each Asymptotically Stable Set if there are no more than two strategies. Our results underline the importance of large message sets and reveal the implicit coordination device that drives the efficiency results in the alternative two type population models.
منابع مشابه
History Independent Prediction in Evolutionary Game Theory*
research interests include evolution and learning in games and the economics of technological standardization. Abstract We survey three classes of models from evolutionary game theory which make history independent predictions: stochastic stability, stochastic stability with local interaction, and cheap talk. We argue that of the three, only local interaction models yield credible history indep...
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