Otávio Bueno Structural Realism , Scientific Change , and Partial Structures
نویسندگان
چکیده
Scientific change has two important dimensions: conceptual change and structural change. In this paper, I argue that the existence of conceptual change brings serious difficulties for scientific realism, and the existence of structural change makes structural realism look quite implausible. I then sketch an alternative account of scientific change, in terms of partial structures, that accommodates both conceptual and structural changes. The proposal, however, is not realist, and supports a structuralist version of van Fraassen’s constructive empiricism (structural empiricism).
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Any account of scientific change needs to accommodate two issues: conceptual and structural changes. In this paper, I argue that standard versions of scientific realism fail to accommodate such issues, and thus ultimately they do not provide an adequate account of scientific change. I then sketch, in terms of da Costa and French’s partial structures approach, an account of scientific change tha...
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