Semiproportional values for TU games
نویسندگان
چکیده
The goal of the paper is to introduce a family of values for transferable utility cooperative games that are proportional for twoperson games and as well satisfying some combinatorial structure composed by contributions of complementary coalitions or, to less extent, marginal contributions by players.
منابع مشابه
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ورودعنوان ژورنال:
- Math. Meth. of OR
دوره 57 شماره
صفحات -
تاریخ انتشار 2003