Legislative Bargaining and Coalition Formation

نویسنده

  • Peter Norman
چکیده

1 This is a revised version of the first chapter of my dissertation and I stand in great debt to my dissertation supervisor Andrew Postlewaite, Stephen Coate, and Stephen Morris for comments, suggestions, encouragement, and patience. Two referees and an associate editor provided detailed comments and criticism that led to significant improvements of the paper. I also thank George Mailath, Andrea Moro, Motty Perry, Torsten Persson, and seminar participants at the University of Pennsylvania, the University of Wisconsin, IIES Stockholm, IUI Stockholm, and the University of Essex for useful comments. The usual disclaimer applies. Peter Norman

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عنوان ژورنال:
  • J. Economic Theory

دوره 102  شماره 

صفحات  -

تاریخ انتشار 2002