A Simple Characterization for Truth-Revealing Single-Item Auctions
نویسندگان
چکیده
We give a simple characterization of all single-item truthrevealing auctions under some mild (and natural) assumptions about the auctions. Our work opens up the possibility of using variational calculus to design auctions having desired properties.
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