Cryptanalysis of a Scalable Grouping-proof Protocol for RFID Tags

The design of secure grouping-proof protocol is imperative to the pervasive deployment of low-cost RFIDs, though many protocols have been published recently. In this paper, we analyze the security vulnerabilities of a scalable grouping-proof protocol for RFID tags based on Shamir’s (n, n) secret sharing proposed by Dang and Kwangjo in 2009. This protocol attempts to alleviate many security weaknesses and improve scalability of previous grouping-proof protocols. However, notwithstanding their theoretical analysis of security and performance, we find out that D-K protocol is vulnerable to malicious attacks, such as man-in-the-middle (MITM) attack, counterfeit attack and untraceability attack and meanwhile fails to provide data confidentiality and tag anonymity. Moreover we point out the design flaws of this protocol which need to be avoided in designing new grouping-proof protocol.