Can the Weak Defeat the Strong? Mao’s Evolving Approach to Asymmetric Warfare in Yan’an

Mao’s confidence in military confrontations with more powerful adversaries continues to inspire Chinese strategists more than half a century later. This article explores the origins and development of Mao’s thinking in this regard, focusing particularly on his years in Yan’an. Drawing on newly available sources, the analysis stresses the importance of experience, as opposed to ideology, in the development of Mao’s martial confidence. For much of his time in Yan’an Mao was relatively circumspect in his military ambitions. Yet towards the end of this period his confidence rose considerably after successes against the KMT offensive in 1946. In short, Mao’s martial confidence did not spring fully formed from his ideological convictions but emerged over time. In many ways, the revolutionary writings of Mao Zedong seem out of date in today’s China. Yet in at least one key respect, Mao’s thought remains relevant: his confidence in military confrontations with more powerful adversaries. Indeed, despite impressive gains in military power since 1949, China still faces the prospect of war with more advanced rivals, or ‘‘asymmetric conflict’’ as it is often called. Some Chinese military writers cite Mao as they revive such slogans as ‘‘using the inferior to defeat the superior’’ (yi lie sheng you 以劣胜优) or ‘‘using the weak to defeat the strong’’ (yi ruo sheng qiang 以弱胜强). Others explore Mao’s writings in more detail as they search for insight into how to prevail over stronger adversaries. In short, what scholars have called Mao’s 1 I use the term ‘‘asymmetric conflict’’ to refer to military competitions in which one side has substantially greater material power than the other. For similar definitions, see Ivan Arreguin-Toft, ‘‘How the weak win wars – a theory of asymmetric conflict,’’ International Security, Vol. 26, No. 1 (2001), pp. 94–96; T. V. Paul, Asymmetric Conflicts: War Initiation by Weaker Powers (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), p. 20. 2 For some recent examples, see Zhu Xinmin, ‘‘Jianchi yi kexue fazhanguan wei zhidao, dali jiaqiang minbing yubeiyi budui jiceng jianshe’’ (‘‘Persist in using scientific development concepts as our guide, greatly strengthen the basic construction of the people’s militia and reserve units’’), Guofang (National Defence) No. 11 (2006), p. 5; Huang Xianzhong, ‘‘Zhandou jingshen he kexue jingshen shi duoqu zhanzheng shengli de fabao’’ (‘‘Fighting spirit and scientific spirit are magic weapons for seizing victory in war’’), Xiandai junshi (Contemporary Military Affairs) No. 7 (2005), pp. 12–13. Note that concepts such as ‘‘using the inferior to defeat the superior’’ did not originate with Mao but can be traced to ancient Chinese writings on military conflict, such as Sun Zi’s Art of War. 3 Wang Shuomin, ‘‘Lun Mao Zedong yi lie sheng you zhanlüe siwei ji qi xianshi yiyi’’ (‘‘On Mao Zedong’s strategic thought about defeating the superior with the inferior and its practical 884 # The China Quarterly, 2008 doi:10.1017/S0305741008001173 ‘‘military romanticism’’ continues to be studied and even celebrated in China today. How did Mao’s ‘‘romantic’’ view of military conflict originally emerge? This question is important because it speaks to the origins of a crucial aspect of Mao’s worldview. It is hard to imagine Maoist China acting with such remarkable military audacity in the Cold War without a leader with such a keen sense of martial prowess. Accordingly, if we wish to understand the course that Mao charted for China in world affairs, we need to ask how his confidence in the military sphere first emerged. The aim of this article is not to assess how justified Mao’s confidence was, or to explore its precise role in the decision-making process. Instead, the goal is to discern how Mao’s martial confidence initially took shape. Understanding the development of Mao’s thought in this regard is all the more important in light of the attention his military writings continue to receive in China today. To illuminate the origins of Mao’s sense of martial prowess, it is natural to focus on the revolutionary period, when most of his military writings were produced – and when he faced vastly more powerful Japanese and Nationalist opponents. To date, most studies of the revolution have not focused on this particular question. While some have written about the ‘‘Yan’an way,’’ for example, these studies do not delve into Mao’s specific military ambitions. Recent biographies of Mao, as well as documentary studies of the revolution, have illuminated specific military decisions, but these have not sought to offer a general assessment of how his martial confidence developed. Some of the best Chinese studies of his military thought still fail to ask whether the optimism