Reference-Dependent Preferences in Multi-Issue Bargaining
نویسنده
چکیده
Game theoretic bargaining models usually assume parties to have exogenously given preferences from the beginning of a negotiation on. Preferences in these models do not depend on the history of offers made during a negotiation. This paper argues that preferences are based on issue-wise reference points changing during the bargaining process as result of the counterparty’s offers.
منابع مشابه
Bargaining with Reference Dependent Preferences
We posit that parties assess bargaining outcomes not in absolute terms but in relative terms vis a vis reference points and we assume that reference points are a ected by prior o ers. In a simple bargaining model, we illustrate how such evolving preferences may be responsible for gradualism and delay in bargaining. We observe that the resulting ine ciency may not vanish even in the limit as the...
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