Deterring Delinquents: A Rational Choice Model of Theft and Violence

siderably in the social sciences, particularly in economics, political science, and law (e.g., Morrow 1994; Posner 1998; Sunstein 1999). In sociology, especially with the popularity of social capital theory, rational choice has gained traction as an individual-level theory of motivation compatible with macro-level theories of social structure (Coleman 1990). Nevertheless, skepticism in sociology persists, in part due to misconceptions, but more importantly due to questions about the explanatory power of rational choice theories. Proponents and skeptics alike agree that a fair assessment of the theory asks whether it has paid off empirically. Hechter and Kanazawa (1997) conclude that some empirical studies support rational explanations (sometimes unwittingly) in areas beyond market behavior, but that additional research is needed to examine rational choice theory in a variety of areas of social life and forms of social action. A challenging and important empirical puzzle for rational choice theory concerns the social control of criminal behavior. Crime is a difficult case for rational choice theory. In the case of street crime, behavior is typically characterized as irrational and suboptimal. This is in contrast to market behavior, financial decisions, and corporate crime, where institutionalized norms frame decision making in the terms of rationality or optimality. Indeed, the media—and some academics—commonly portray street criminals as impulsive, unthinking, Deterring Delinquents: A Rational Choice Model of Theft and Violence