How many sorting equilibria are there ( generically ) ? ∗
نویسنده
چکیده
It is shown that in a generic two-jurisdiction model of the type introduced by Caplin and Nalebuff (1997), the number of sorting equilibria (with jurisdictions providing distinct policies) is finite and even.
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