Relating Process Algebras and Multiset Rewriting for Security Protocol Analysis
نویسندگان
چکیده
When formalizing security protocols, different specification languages support very different reasoning methodologies, whose results are not directly or easily comparable. Therefore, establishing clear relationships among different frameworks is highly desirable, as it permits various methodologies to cooperate by interpreting theoretical and practical results of one system in another. In this paper, we examine the nontrivial relationship between two general verification frameworks: multiset rewriting (MSR) and a process algebra (PA) inspired to the CCS and the π-calculus. We present two separate mappings, one from MSR to PA and the other from PA to MSR. Although defining a simple and general bijection between MSR and PA appears difficult, we show that in the specific context of cryptographic protocols they do admit effective translations that preserve traces
منابع مشابه
Relating multiset rewriting and process algebras for security protocol analysis
When formalizing security protocols, different specificationlanguages support very different reasoning methodologies, whose resultsare not directly or easily comparable. Therefore, establishing clear map-pings among different frameworks is highly desirable, as it permits vari-ous methodologies to cooperate by interpreting theoretical and practicalresults of one system into a...
متن کاملRelating Process Algebras and Multiset Rewriting (for Example for Security Protocol Analysis)
Distributed systems are abstractly viewed as either a collection of agents communicating through a global state, or as a set of processes that evolve by pairwise exchanging messages. Languages and frameworks that adopt these two views generally yield very different specifications of the same system, and support distinct reasoning methodologies. In this paper, we examine the non-trivial relation...
متن کاملRelating Strands and Multiset Rewriting for Security Protocol Analysis Revised Extended Abstracty
Formal analysis of security protocols is largely based on a set of assumptions commonly referred to as the Dolev-Yao model. Two formalisms that state the basic assumptions of this model are related here: strand spaces [6] and multiset rewriting with existential quantification [2, 5]. Although it is fairly intuitive that these two languages should be equivalent in some way, a number of modificat...
متن کاملRelating Strands and Multiset Rewriting for Security Protocol Analysis
Formal analysis of security protocols is largely based on a set of assumptions commonly referred to as the Dolev-Yao model. Two formalisms that state the basic assumptions of this model are related here: strand spaces [6] and multiset rewriting with existential quantification [2, 5]. Although it is fairly intuitive that these two languages should be equivalent in some way, a number of modificat...
متن کامل