Large all-pay auctions with IPV bidders
نویسندگان
چکیده
This note analyzes di¤erent types of all-pay auctions when the number of bidders becomes large. We compute the distributions of the highest bids for the rst-price all pay auction and we show that the expected payment made by the winning bidder converges to half of the total payments. In the second-price all-pay auction (the war of attrition), the highest bid amounts to about 35.5 % of the total revenues. We also compute the payments for all-pay auctions with multiple prizes.
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ورودعنوان ژورنال:
- J. Economic Theory
دوره 169 شماره
صفحات -
تاریخ انتشار 2017