Pair-wise path key establishment in wireless sensor networks

When sensor networks deployed in unattended and hostile environments, for securing communication between sensors, secret keys must be established between them. Many key establishment schemes have been proposed for large scale sensor networks. In these schemes, each sensor shares a secret key with its neighbors via preinstalled keys. But it may occur that two end nodes which do not share a key with each other could use a secure path to share a secret key between them. However during the transmission of the secret key, the secret key will be revealed to each node along the secure path. Several researchers proposed a multi-path key establishment to prevent a few compromised sensors from knowing the secret key, but it is vulnerable to stop forwarding or Byzantine attacks. To counter these attacks, we propose a hop by hop authentication scheme for path key establishment to prevent Byzantine attacks. Compared to conventional protocols, our proposed scheme can mitigate the impact of malicious nodes from doing a Byzantine attack and sensor nodes can identify the malicious nodes. In addition, our scheme can save energy since it can detect and filter false data not beyond two hops. 2007 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.