Pure vs. Mixed Motive Games: On the Perception of Payoff-Orders
نویسنده
چکیده
I study the payoff orders of bimatrix games classifying them into pure mutual interest, pure conflict and mixed motive games. These notions, informally introduced by [13] Schelling (1960), are then used to explore experimentally some regularities of perception of strategic interaction in 2x2 games with incomplete information about the opponent’s payoff matrix. Using data from [10] Oechssler/Schipper (2000) I find that subjects do learn the nature of the game, that is they perceive whether the true game is a pure mutual interest or a pure conflict game. JEL-Classifications: C70, C72
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