The Effects of Threat upon Bargaining*

نویسندگان

  • Robert J. Meeker
  • Gerald H. Shure
چکیده

INTRODUCTION Most behavioral scientists are well aware of computer technology as a means of reducing and otherwise analyzing empirically derived data. A small number have also discovered, and enthusiastically endorsed, the computer's potential for simulation of analytic models. But little has been made of yet another application of computer technology in the behavioral sciences, namely, the use of computers for data acquisition.

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تاریخ انتشار 2010