Strategic Asymmetry in Dynamic Coordination Games with Learning
نویسندگان
چکیده
This paper studies a simple model of dynamic coordination with learning under incomplete information. We show that strategic asymmetry arises where the predecessor’s strategy is a strategic substitute for the successor’s while the latter is a strategic complement for the former. The role of dynamics and learning is identified by comparing the strategic interactions in the coordination games with different information and timing structures. We also demonstrate that dynamics with learning induces players to take more aggressive strategies.
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