End-to-end veriable voting with Prêt à Voter
نویسنده
چکیده
Transparent and verifiable elections can be achieved by end-to-end verifiable electronic voting systems. The purpose of such systems is to enable voters to verify the inclusion of their vote in the final tally while keeping the votes secret. Achieving verifiability and secrecy at the same time is hard and this thesis explores the properties of verifiable electronic voting systems and describes a set of developments to the end-to-end verifiable electronic voting system Prêt à Voter to achieve these.
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