Weakly Dominated Strategies: a Mystery Cracked
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چکیده
An informal argument shows that common knowledge of rationality implies the iterative elimination of strictly dominated strategies. Rationality here means that players do not play strategies that are strictly dominanted relative to their knowledge. We formalize and prove this claim. When by rationality we mean that players do not play strategies that are weakly dominanted relative to their knowledge, then common knowledge of rationality does not imply iterative elimination of weakly dominated strategies. We show that it does imply an iterative elimination of dominance bases of weakly dominated
منابع مشابه
Weakly Dominated Strategies: a Mystery Cracked
An informal argument shows that common knowledge of rationality implies the iterative elimination of strongly dominated strategies. Rationality here means that players do not play strategies that are strongly dominated relative to their knowledge. We formalize and prove this claim. When by rationality we mean that players do not play strategies that are weakly dominated relative to their knowle...
متن کاملWeakly Dominated Strategies: a Mystery Cracked
An informal argument shows that common knowledge of rationality implies the iterative elimination of strongly dominated strategies. Rationality here means that players do not play strategies that are strongly dominated relative to their knowledge. We formalize and prove this claim. When by rationality we mean that players do not play strategies that are weakly dominated relative to their knowle...
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