GDS-II Trojan detection using multiple supply pad VDD and GND IDDQs in ASIC functional units

We propose a parametric, side-channel-based method designed to detect malicious changes that have been made to the chip layout, i.e., the GDS-II representation, by an adversary. We measure steady-state leakage currents (I DDQ) from multiple, topologically distributed power ports on the chip and propose a chip-averaging method for eliminating within-die variations and improving the Hardware Trojan (HT) signal-to-process-noise detection sensitivity of our statistical-based detection methods. The technique is validated for the first time by measuring I DDQ from an ASIC with Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) and Floating Point Unit (FPU) macros, 16 V DD and GND ports and a set of special HT emulation circuits. I DDQ data is measured from multiple copies of the IBM, 90 nm ASIC.