Cournot Competition and Endogenous Firm Size∗
نویسندگان
چکیده
We model the firm as a type of artificial neural network that plays a repeated Cournot game. Each period the firm must learn to map environmental signals to both demand parameters and it’s rival’s output choice. In this paper, though, this Cournot game is in the ’background,’ as we focus on the endogenous adjustment of network size. We investigate the long-run behavior of firm/network size as a function of profits, rival’s size, and the type of adjustment rules used. Kew words: Artificial neural networks, firm size, adjustment dynamics. ∗This draft has been prepared for the 10th International Conference on Computing in Economics and Finance, July 8-10, 2004, University of Amsterdam, The Netherlands. †Corresponding Author. Dept. of Economics, Rutgers University, Newark, NJ 07102, email: [email protected]. ‡Observatoire Français des Conjonctures Économiques, 69 Quai d’Orsay, Paris 75007, France. email: [email protected]
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