John Turri, "On the Regress Argument for Infinitism"

This paper critically evaluates the regress argument for infinitism. The dialectic is essentially this. Peter Klein argues that only an infinitist can, without being dogmatic, enhance the credibility of a questioned non-evident proposition. In response, I demonstrate that a foundationalist can do this equally well. Furthermore, I explain how foundationalism can provide for infinite chains of justification. I conclude that the regress argument for infinitism should not convince us. Infinitism offers a theory of justification as well as a solution to the epistemic regress problem. Discussion of infinitism goes back at least to Aristotle. However, compared to its main non-skeptical competitors, foundationalism and coherentism, its resources remain largely underdeveloped, and its potential benefits, should there be any, unappreciated. This paper critically evaluates one argument for infinitism: 1 Posterior Analytics, 72b5 ff.