Maintaining a Reputation When Strategies Are Imperfectly Observed
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Reputation with Long Run Players and Imperfect Observation
Previous work shows that reputation results may fail in repeated games between two long-run players with equal discount factors. We restrict attention to an infinitely repeated game where two players with equal discount factors play a simultaneous move stage game where actions of player 2 are imperfectly observed. The set of commitment types for player 1 is taken as any (countable) set of finit...
متن کاملReputational Incentives and Dynamics∗
We study a dynamic moral hazard model, where a firm can invest into the quality of its product which, in turn, is imperfectly observed by consumers. We analyse how investment incentives depend on the firm’s reputation and the information structure of consumer learning, and solve for the resulting reputational dynamics. When consumers learn through good news, investment incentives are increasing...
متن کاملStructural Model of Brand Ambidexterity Impact on Brand Commitment through Brand’s Performance, Image and Reputation
Brand ambidexterity strategies help organizations improve their capabilities and performance and simultaneously discover new opportunities. The purpose of this study is to investigate the effects of brand ambidexterity strategies on brand commitment through brand’s performance, image and reputation. The statistical population of this research were the users of Pishgaman Company. Random sampling...
متن کاملPunishment and Gossip: Sustaining Cooperation in a Public Goods Game
In an environment in which free-riders are better off than cooperators, social control is required to foster and maintain cooperation. There are two main paths through which social control can be applied: punishment and reputation. Our experiments explore the efficacy of punishment and reputation on cooperation rates, both in isolation and in combination. Using a Public Goods Game, we are inter...
متن کاملEmpirical Analysis of Reputation-aware Task Delegation by Humans from a Multi-agent Game
What are the strategies people adopt when deciding how to delegated tasks to agents when the agents’ reputation and productivity information is available? How effective are these strategies under different conditions? These questions are important since they have significant implications to the ongoing research of reputation aware task delegation in multi-agent systems (MASs). In this paper, we...
متن کامل