Asymmetric first-price auctions with uniform distributions: analytic solutions to the general case
نویسندگان
چکیده
In 1961, Vickrey posed the problem of finding an analytic solution to a first-price auction with two buyers having valuations uniformly distributed on [v1, v1] and [v2, v2]. To date, only special cases of the problem have been solved. In this paper, we solve this general problem and in addition allow for the possibility of a binding minimum bid. Several interesting examples are presented, including a class where the two bid functions are linear.
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