Decentralized licensing of complementary patents: Comparing the royalty, fixed-fee and two-part tariff regimes
نویسندگان
چکیده
This paper explores the decentralized licensing of complementary patents reading on a technology standard. We develop a model in which manufacturers must buy licenses from di¤erent patent owners in order to enter the market for di¤erentiated standard-compliant products. We consider three di¤erent types of licensing, namely, the xed-fee, per-unit royalty and two-part tari¤ regimes, and compare their performances in terms of licensing revenue, price, product variety and welfare. We show that each regime entails di¤erent types of coordination failures. We establish that each of them may maximize the licensing revenue depending on the number of licensors, number of potential entrants and product di¤erentiation. 1Dr. Yann Ménière, Cerna, MINES ParisTech, 60 bd St Michel, 75006 Paris, France. (email: [email protected]) 2Dr. Sarah Parlane, School of Economics, University College Dublin, Bel eld, Dublin 4, Ireland. (email: [email protected]) 1 ha l-0 04 60 75 4, v er si on 1 2 M ar 2 01 0 Author manuscript, published in "Information Economics and Policy 22, 2 (2010) 178-191" DOI : 10.1016/j.infoecopol.2009.10.003
منابع مشابه
The Optimal Licensing Contract in a Differentiated Stackelberg Model
This paper extends the work of Wang (2002) by considering a differentiated Stackelberg model, when the leader firm is an inside innovator and licenses its new technology by three options, that is, fixed-fee licensing, royalty licensing, and two-part tariff licensing. The main contributions and conclusions of this paper are threefold. First of all, this paper derives a very different result from...
متن کاملDecentralized of licensing of complementary patents: comparing royalty, xed fee and two part tari¤
This paper analyzes how an inventor should x the licensing terms to license a standard in complying with a non-discrimination requirement. Using a model incorporating imperfect competition between a nite number of users and product di¤erentiation, we compare three di¤erent regimes: xed fee (also known as royalty free), per unit royalty and two-part tari¤. We highlight the di¤erent e¤ects of ...
متن کاملOptimal Licensing Policy in Differentiated Industries
This paper analyses the policy implications of licensing between producers of differentiated goods. We consider and compare two-part tariff, fixed fee, royalty and collusive licensing contracts. Under the optimal licensing policy, there will be no technology transfers if the innovation size is sufficiently small and degree of product differentiation is sufficiently low. On the other hand, licen...
متن کاملHow Strong Are Weak Patents?
We analyze patent licensing by a patent holder to downstream technology users. We study how the structure and level of royalties depends on the patent’s strength, i.e., the probability it would be upheld in court. We examine the social value of determining patent validity before licensing, in terms of deadweight loss (ex post) and innovation incentives (ex ante). When downstream users do not co...
متن کاملPer unit vs. ad valorem royalties under asymmetric information
a r t i c l e i n f o JEL classification: D21 D43 D44 D45 Keywords: Patent licensing Insider Asymmetric information Per unit royalty Ad valorem royalty We study an inside patent holder's optimal licensing policy when it has imperfect information about the value of the patent to its rival. The patent holder can choose any two-part licensing fee with either per unit or ad valorem royalties. We de...
متن کاملذخیره در منابع من
با ذخیره ی این منبع در منابع من، دسترسی به آن را برای استفاده های بعدی آسان تر کنید
برای دانلود متن کامل این مقاله و بیش از 32 میلیون مقاله دیگر ابتدا ثبت نام کنید
ثبت ناماگر عضو سایت هستید لطفا وارد حساب کاربری خود شوید
ورودعنوان ژورنال:
- Information Economics and Policy
دوره 22 شماره
صفحات -
تاریخ انتشار 2010